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NOT QUITE “JUSTICE FOR ALL”: HOW PROVISIONS OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LEGISLATION CAN HARM PLEA
NEGOTIATIONS
Hannah Williams1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, the history of our criminal justice system has been unkind to victims
of crime.2 This demographic, if acknowledged at all, would historically sit in our nation’s
courtrooms and watch as the criminal justice system happened to them.3 Congress
fundamentally altered the role of victims in 2015 when it enacted a statute granting victims a
plethora of new rights.4 Victims suddenly could confer with the state’s attorney and rely on
protections from the government against the accused.5 Interspersed within victims’ newfound
rights is the right to be reasonably heard at any plea proceeding and the ability to reopen a
plea if the defendant did not plead to the highest offense charged.6
This article is not intended to persuade the reader that the history and progress
brought by Victims’ Rights legislation brings more harm than benefits to the criminal justice
system. Society should celebrate any progress that enables a portion of Americans to receive
just treatment under the law after periods of historical neglect. For most of our time as a
nation, victims have not had their rights specifically laid out in any legal format.7 The steps
taken by activists to make known the rights and desires of the victims of crime help to make a
more just criminal system.
This does not mean that further change is not necessary. This article argues that
without altering the depth of a victim’s rights regarding the plea-bargaining stage of the
proceedings, the guilty plea will be further misaligned from the compromise-focused and
mutually beneficial nature of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).8 Statistics show a lopsided
adjudication preference with Ninety (90%) of all federal criminal proceedings generally,9 and
1

B.A., Huntington University, 2020; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2023; Associate
Member, Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2021-2023. I am grateful to Professor Rodney Uphoff for
his insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the Journal of Dispute Resolution
for its help in the editing process. I want to thank my parents Nate and Amanda Williams for helping me get to
a position where I can pursue my Juris Doctorate and add to the discourse of topics I am passionate about.
2
See Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims’ Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from
Crime, 19 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 221, 222 (2013).
3
See
generally
History
of
Victims’
Rights,
NAT’L
CRIME
VICTIM
L.
INST.,
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/about_ncvli/history_of_victims_rights/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2022).
4
See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771.
5
Id. § 3771(a)(1), (5).
6
Id. § 3771(a)(4), (d)(5)(C).
7
See History of Victims’ Rights, supra note 3 (the instigator of the Victims’ Rights Movement was the 1982
final report of the President’s Task Force for the Victims of Crime).
8
The rights referenced here are found in § 3771 (a)(4) and (d)(5)(C).
9
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Defendants Go to Trial, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-
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Ninety-five (95%) of all criminal proceedings in the state of Missouri and Missouri’s federal
circuit are disposed of at the plea-bargaining stage.10 Viewing plea-bargaining through the
traditional structure of ADR11 means that in every federal12 and state case,13 an extra nonneutral party is involved who is allowed to voice their opinion in a negotiation that should be
between two equally powerful parties.14 This should cause concern if the non-litigatory option
for criminal proceedings is to be of the same nature as its sister option on the civil side. Even
though plea-bargaining and traditional ADR negotiation are more mere sisters than twins,
both should aim for a fairly negotiated, dually beneficial compromise.
Part II of this note lays out the foundational principles that govern ADR and, more
specifically, negotiation. Part III sets forth an understanding of how plea-bargaining works
and highlights its characteristics. Part IV walks through the few similarities and troubling
differences between the two sister systems. Part V highlights the passions that stormed victim
desires to the desks of legislators by discussing the history of the Victims’ Rights Movement.
Part VI spotlights the obstacles to justice that accompany a decision to allow another party to
have a significant role in the plea-bargaining process. The article concludes by suggesting
alterations that aim to allow a fair process for defendants while maintaining the rights of the
victims.
II.

PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In its most basic and broad form, the practices of ADR offer non-litigatory options
for parties looking to settle disputes.15 They allow for a more time-efficient and less
burdensome16 use of the court system which should, in turn, benefit those cases that require
use of the court system in resolving their dispute.17 Through its various modes of discussionbased resolutions,18 ADR benefits the dueling parties by providing a more private, cost-

who-do-are-found-guilty/ (click the hyperlink in the opening paragraph titled “data collected by the federal
judiciary” to see the data for this finding).
10
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANN. REP. FED. SENT’G STAT. (2020). Altogether, the 8th district adjudicated
4578/4694 (97.5%) of criminal defendants via plea bargain; Missouri state courts adjudicated 1590/1622
(98.0%) of criminal defendants via plea bargain: 917/925 (99.1%) in the E.D. & 673/697 (96.6%) in the W.D.
11
The first Part of this article describes the traditional alternative dispute resolution standards. All specific
information required for the reading of this article is provided within.
12
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4), (d)(5)(C).
13
Andrew Nash, Victims by Definition, 85 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (2008) (all 50 states have passed
victims’ rights statutes, and 32 states have amended their constitutions to protect victims’ rights).
14
This analogy again references 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a)(4) and (d)(5)(C). Both provisions essentially allow a
victim to voice their opinion in how plea bargain negotiations and final output are handled.
15
See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1986).
16
See
generally
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last updated Nov. 2021).
17
See Edwards, supra note 15, at 673.
18
Mediation: A form of assisted negotiations where the parties hire a neutral third party whose goal is to help
the two parties come to an agreement. The goal is to find a mutually acceptable resolution as early as possible
Judicial Arbitration: A similar three-party discussion with one of the parties being neutral to the issue, but the
neutral third-party acts as a private judge. This private judge hears the discussions from both sides and makes a
determination on the case followed by an award determination. This decision is binding on the parties.
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effective, and sometimes more creative final agreement than its adjudicatory counterpart.19
There is an air of compromise and mutual benefit that is apparent in the world of ADR,
exemplified in the practice of negotiation.20
The beauty of negotiation is that it is not inherently a legal concept.21 Laypersons
young and old and from all walks of life use negotiation to work out deals and compromises
with whom they are in constant contact.22 Teenagers desiring more freedom negotiate with
their parents about curfew hours. Co-workers at a fast-food restaurant negotiate about what it
would take to have one of them cover the other’s shift for the upcoming weekend. These
scenarios occur daily for most people, only differing from negotiation in the legal field by the
use of less formal attire and less explicit roles and functions.
Legal negotiation can also be a very simple practice. In its most basic form, it only
comprises of two parties, just the attorneys for the parties in conflict, and reaches its
conclusion once the parties decide to compromise or not compromise.23 On the surface, the
attorneys for the parties are pushing and pulling to a degree specified by the client to reach
common ground and finalize an agreement to which both parties consent.24 Just below the
surface, however, the dynamics of bargaining power and an attorney’s proficiency with
negotiation tactics are at play.25
Another difference between the everyday negotiations we see and the ones that take
place between attorneys on behalf of their clients is that there are more concrete procedures
and roles in legal negotiation. Where an informal negotiation can happen in almost any
context, an ideal negotiation under the principles of ADR requires: (1) the parties in conflict
have a mutually acknowledged relationship; (2) there is an identifiable conflict; (3) the parties
agree that this conflict is amenable through negotiation; and (4) both sides recognize the other
as a legitimate negotiation partner.26 When those features are present, additional fine-tuning
mechanisms should also be present in order to make the negotiation smoother and more
Med-Arb: A combination of Mediation and Arbitration. The two parties bring their cases before a neutral thirdparty and that party acts as both the mediator and the arbitrator. If the parties are able to come to a mutually
acceptable resolution on some topics, but not others, the med-arbitrator will make a binding decision on any
issue not finalized by the parties themselves.
BETTE J. ROTH ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE 4–8 (1993).
19
Stephen D. Marcus, Goals and Objectives for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2 J. PERFORM. CONSTRUCTED
FACIL. 2, 5–7 (1988) (other benefits listed: timing/speed, damage control, finality, calming & compromising,
having a knowledgeable decision-maker, issue-focused nature, user-friendly, fairness, limited discovery, and it
is educational).
20
ROTH, supra note 18 (“. . . [ADR] . . . represents a willingness by parties to voluntarily invest time and
energy in coming to terms with difficult issues, examining how disagreements arise, and then working together
to amicably settle those differences.”).
21
See generally What are Negotiation Situations?, PROGRAM ON NEGOT. HARV. L. SCH.,
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/tag/negotiation-situations/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
22
See generally id.
23
JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY, THE LITTLE BOOK OF STRATEGIC NEGOTIATION 5 (2005).
24
John Allison, How to Approach Settlement Negotiations, SMART LAW. (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:15 PM),
https://www.nationaljurist.com/smartlawyer/how-approach-settlement-negotiations.
25
See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMAN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 303 (5th ed. 2015) (the aim of negotiation is to
make an agreement on terms as favorable as possible to the attorney’s client).
26
DOCHERTY, supra note 23, at 20–21.
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successful.27 Those features include mutually accepted rules of behavior, shared norms of
fairness, relative certainty that the parties in conflict have a shared future, and there is either a
formal or informal institution that will enforce the agreement.28 While it may seem that there
are quite a few tedious details required for negotiation, the drastic difference in outcomes that
follow from either adherence to or abandonment from those details make the tediousness of
those details worthwhile.
Another important aspect of negotiation is determining the different negotiation
styles employed by negotiating attorneys: “cooperative” versus “competitive.” As evident by
their respective names, one style tends to work with the other side more in reaching a final
agreement while the other works against the other side and holds their client’s position
sternly in reaching an agreement.29 A study30 conducted in 1999 showed that 54% of
“cooperative” negotiators were found to be effective31 while the same could be said for only
9% of “competitive” negotiators.32 While it is more understood today that negotiating styles
fall more on a spectrum than this stated binary,33 for the sake of clarity in the comparative
analysis, the only acknowledged negotiation styes in this article will be “competitive” and the
“cooperative.”
III. PLEA BARGAINING
Plea bargaining is the process where, after determining what the defendant is
charged with, the prosecutor might offer to lessen the charges or a more lenient sentence if the
defendant agrees to plead guilty before the case goes to trial.34 The most notable aspect of
plea bargaining is that it is non-litigatory.35 In its most simple form, the process and purpose
of a criminal trial is to determine whether the defendant is guilty of the filed charges and if so,
what the punishment would be for those charges.36 Accepting a plea bargain and pleading

27

Id. at 7.
Id.
29
See Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and Value Claiming During
Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 101, 104 (2010).
30
Id. at 105 (The surveyor asked attorneys from Milwaukee and Chicago to characterize other attorneys they
had recently negotiated with as either “Competitive” or “Cooperative.” The surveyor also asked them to
indicate whether the attorney they identified was an effective, average, or ineffective negotiator. 64% of the
attorneys were characterized as “Cooperative” while 36% were characterized as “Competitive”).
31
Id. (finding that 42% were considered average; 4% were considered ineffective).
32
Id. (noting that 38% were considered average; 53% were considered ineffective).
33
Id. at 106. (In this article, the original styles were divided into Cooperative/Problem-Solving and
Competitive/Adversarial. Those categories are broken down further into a hybrid style referred to as
Competitive/Problem-Solving, where the goal is maximizing the returns for one’s client but doing it in a nonadversarial way).
34
See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial – Plea Bargaining, ABA (Nov. 28, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/pleabargaining/.
35
For the purposes of this note, the word “non-litigatory” refers to the fact that cases that end in a plea bargain
do not go to trial. See generally OFF. OF U.S. ATT’YS., Justice 101: Plea Bargaining, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/pleabargaining (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
36
See generally OFF. OF U.S. ATT’YS., Justice 101: Trial, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/trial (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
28
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guilty to the charges eliminates the need for a trial. 37 The parties get to that point through
negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense attorney. 38
When a defendant agrees to a guilty plea, thus negotiating away certain liberties and
freedoms, the State considers this agreement when it recommends a specific punishment to
the judge.39 That assumption should be warranted through the negotiations between the two
attorneys, and the following discussion between the defendant and counsel.40 Both of these
important discussions occur before the projected start of the trial.41 This means that both the
prosecutor and the defense attorney have significant work to do in the early stages of the
case.42
The attorneys for the state and the defense share few similarities when it comes to
their roles in the process. The prosecutor, who is not representing an individual client but the
state as a whole, must complete a preliminary investigation to determine the relative strengths
and weaknesses of their case against a particular defendant.43 After this analysis of the
evidence, the prosecutor has the choice of not filing any charges,44 dropping the charges and
letting the defendant go, or if he or she decides that there is enough evidence that the case
could be taken to trial, the prosecutor can conjure up what she believes to be an appropriate
plea offer.45 The defense attorney has a much different, and arguably heavier, role to fulfill.
Their main objective is to make sure their client, the defendant, makes the best choice when
deciding to either take their case to trial or to plead out.46 In order to properly advise their
client, the attorney should complete a few preparatory tasks. The first, and sometimes the
most crucial task, is the initial client interview.47 During the initial client interview, the
attorney can learn valuable information about their client that could be helpful in gaining
some leverage in the negotiation process or alternatively, learn something that takes pleading
guilty completely off the table.48 Additionally, part of the role of the defense attorney, in the
plea negotiations and possibly at trial, is to humanize their client.49 That task can seem like a
daunting one depending on what the charges are against them, but it becomes even harder
when, through a poor interview, the attorney only knows their client as the two-dimensional
person who these charges are filed against.
37

See generally Plea Bargaining, supra note 35.
See generally id.
39
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. & WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, GOV. DOC. NO. 7-1985, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL
ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 6 (1985).
40
See Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea
Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103, 2108 (2014).
41
See id. at 2109.
42
See id. At 2108.
43
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. & MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 46.
44
Jurisdictionally dependent.
45
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. & MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 6 (eliminating weak cases or pleading out stronger
ones creates less of a burden on the court system).
46
Joy, supra note 40, at 2111.
47
See id. at 2107–09.
48
See id. at 2109 (Defense counsel failed to learn that by accepting a guilty plea, the defendant would be
deported).
49
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL
L. REV. 73, 100 (1995).
38
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The leverage aspect noted earlier comes in the form of mitigating circumstances.
During the initial client interview, the attorney may learn of important characteristics that
could make their client seem more sympathetic to a jury or help their case in some other
fashion.50 Similarly, after conducting this interview, the attorney could have a better idea of
the possible lesser offenses that their client could be charged with.51 Knowing this
information gives the defense attorney additional leverage, especially if the case against the
defendant is not as strong as the prosecutor may represent it to be.52
In conjunction with the client interview, the defense attorney also must conduct a
preliminary investigation for reasons similar to the prosecution. He or she needs to determine
the strength of the case against their client and learn what some of the weaknesses in the case
are so they can attempt to expose those weaknesses in discussions or in trial.53 The attorney
does this through interviews of potential witnesses and thorough analyses of the provided
discovery materials, including the forensic evidence gathered in the case.54
The defense attorney has the more burdensome of the two roles in this scenario due
to a multitude of factors,55 but significantly because of the potential consequences that could
possibly affect their client. In addition to the loss of liberty and freedom that comes with
pleading guilty to a crime, the defendant is barred from utilizing certain Constitutional rights.
Once a defendant agrees to the plea deal, they waive their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury,
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to call their own witnesses, to testify on their own
behalf, and to require the state to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.56 While the
defendant may be able to petition for post-conviction relief, it is unlikely he or she would be
able to raise a direct appeal on their conviction and sentence.57 There are major risks posed to
the defendant no matter the direction the attorney advises them. When liberty is on the line,
even the most experienced and resourced defense attorney will feel the pressure of the entire
criminal justice system barreling towards their client.58 A good defense attorney will make
sure their client is well-informed and ready to take on a guilty plea, or in the alternative, trial.

50

See U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. & MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 69–70. (Common mitigating factors include: age,
sex, race, marital status, social class, political or family connections, demeanor, history of employment, drug
use, alcohol use, psychiatric problems, physical health problems, military service, their relationship to the
victim, and publicity).
51
Uphoff, supra note 49, at 104.
52
Id. (lesser offense might be a good compromise).
53
See Joy & Uphoff, supra note 40, at 2109
54
Id.
55
Most times, the state has a “head-start” when it comes to preparing its case. For example, sometimes the
case may be brought to a defense attorney’s attention years after the crime occurred.
56
Joy & Uphoff, supra note 40, at 2106.
57
Id.
58
See generally Jeena Cho, When Caring Costs You: Lawyers Can Experience Vicarious Trauma from Their
Work, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2020, 1:15 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/when-caring-costs-youlawyers-can-experience-vicarious-trauma-from-work (“[P]ublic defenders and criminal defense lawyers are at
risk for vicarious trauma because ‘[they] see a multitude of trauma inflicted on our clients and their families by
the criminal punishment bureaucracy.’”).
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IV. SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON
This section will be broken down into similarities and differences between
negotiation generally and plea bargaining. Importantly, the similarities between the two
concepts tend to be on their common structure and procedures, whereas the differences lie in
the actuality and reality of their practices. This variance allows the insertion of victims’ rights
into plea bargaining to tip the scales of justice away from defendants.
A.

Similarities

Since negotiation and plea bargaining are both non-litigatory options, they share
many outward similarities. They present themselves as the criminal and civil versions of one
another, so many of the characteristics observed translate from criminal to civil discussions.
One of those characteristics is a familiarity with the type of attorney on the other side.59
On the civil side, knowing whether the opposing counsel is a “cooperative” or
“competitive” negotiator can help determine how an attorney will prepare. The criminal
defense attorney should base their approach to negotiations on what they know about the
prosecutor’s personality, philosophy, trial ability and negotiating style.60 These aspects, in
both the civil and criminal contexts, can help an attorney predict the likely success of the
negotiation or help them foundationally prepare for the possibility of pending litigation.61
The “motions” the attorneys take when interacting with their clients and with the
opposing counsel during the negotiation are along the same vein.. During both the prenegotiation and post-negotiation attorney/client discussion, the attorney must speak with
candor about the likely outcomes of the case.62 Because the decision to either accept or deny
the negotiated offer is up to the client and not the attorney, the client must be presented with
an accurate outlook on the case.63 For a civil case, this could look like the attorney telling
their client what the attorney knows about the opposing counsel and estimating how the
negotiation will go. For a criminal case, through their preliminary investigation, the defense
attorney might be able to predict a standard offer,64 what that could mean for their client if the
client accepts, and what the outcome might be if the client declines the offer and the case goes
to trial.65
The alternative to the candor required when talking with a client is “bluffing” when
negotiating with opposing counsel. Hiding a case’s weaknesses has the obvious effect of
making one’s case look stronger; it is almost standard practice in civil negotiations.66
59

Uphoff, supra note 49, at 110.
Id.
61
See id. at 104. Knowing a prosecutor is eager to dispose of cases prior to trial could give the defense
attorney more leverage in negotiations since the prosecutor isn’t looking to take the matter to trial. Knowing
that a prosecutor is a good trial attorney could make a negotiated plea a more attractive option.
62
Joy & Uphoff, supra note 40, at 2110.
63
See id.
64
This assumption of a standard offer may come from an understanding of what the state has offered in the
past for similar cases and the likelihood of what the judge will accept for their type of case.
65
Joy & Uphoff, supra note 40, at 2110.
66
See KRIEGER & NEUMAN, JR., supra note 25, at 347.
60

139
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository,

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Regardless if it is standard practice on the criminal side, most prosecutor’s do not disapprove
of it, while some “avow their practices to bluffing, concealment, and telling half-truths.”67 As
the word “bluffing” indicates, this is done when a prosecutor still attempts to negotiate a
guilty plea when they know that their case is either very weak or there is no real case at all.68
Just as one can typically tell two sisters are related by the things they do and the way
they look, plea-bargaining and civil negotiation draw their similarities from the outward
characteristics and motions they present. However, just as mere sisters are different than
twins, a deeper look into the true nature of plea bargaining and civil negotiation begins the
analysis of their malignment.
B.

Differences

The starkest differences between civil and criminal negotiations show up when
discussing the reality of the two and how they play out in practice. This section combines
many smaller features into one main overarching difference: power differential.
There are a multitude of ways a person can define “power”69 in the context of a
negotiation, but inherent in them all is the fact that when a party lacks power, their ability to
achieve a positive outcome is severely diminished.70 In most civil negotiations, both parties
possess certain facts that give them some leverage (power) to move the discussion and the
outcome in their favor.71 This is often not the case in plea negotiations.
As discussed earlier, it is a part of the prosecutor’s role to complete a preliminary
investigation and determine what they think would be an acceptable sentence for the
defendant to receive based on the evidentiary support in conjunction with the defendant’s
prior criminal record.72 The defense attorney, though their investigation, can suggest possible
lesser offenses or bring mitigating factors to the table. In the end, it is the prosecutor who
wields the power to choose what sentence to present to the judge.73 This power imbalance
makes it difficult for both sides to mutually gain to the same degree. 74 In the criminal context,
it might be understandable to not have both parties “mutually gain” to the same extent and to

67

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 49.
See id.
69
KRIEGER & NEUMAN, JR., supra note 25, at 304 (“Power is the ability to coerce someone to do something he
would not otherwise do.”) (“[P]ower . . . is coercion without resorting to enforcement of legal rights.”);
PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: DEVELOPING MORAL COURAGE IN RESOLVING
OUR CONFLICTS 47 (2002) (“[Power is p]ossession of control, authority, or influence over others; the ability to
act or produce an effect . . .”).
70
See KRITEK, supra note 69, at 47.
71
See generally KRIEGER & NEUMAN, JR., supra note 25, at 317 (During the initial client interview, the
attorney learns what the end-goal is for the client and subsequently what facts the client possesses in order to
bring about that result).
72
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 46.
73
See Plea Bargain, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plea_bargain (last visited Feb. 15,
2022).
74
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 833 (1991).
68

140
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2022/iss2/10

8

Williams: Not Quite “Justice for All”: How Provisions of Victims’ Rights Le

Not Quite “Justice for All”: How provisions of Victims’ Rights Legislation can harm plea
negotiations
have an unequal power distribution, but that truth does pull plea-bargaining away from its
civil counterpart.75
Adding to this different power dynamic is the fact that, for many defendants, they do
not get a choice when it comes to who their attorney is.76 If they qualify for a public defender,
they are assigned an attorney by the state.77 Contrasted with civil negotiations, the parties in
conflict get to choose their attorney, so there is a different sense of trust and comfort in the
attorney/client relationship.78 That almost immediate sense of trust and comfort comes much
later, if at all, and at a much slower pace in the indigent defendant/public defender context.79
In addition, when a defendant is being represented by an attorney they did not choose, and
their liberty is on the line, the amount of pressure riding on the plea negotiation could be
significantly higher than in the civil counterpart.
As alluded to above, for the defendants who are being represented by a public
defender, the added pressures of the underfunded public defender’s office weigh heavily in
plea negotiations. The foundation laid in Part II details the roles and specific tasks of the
prosecutor and the defense attorney;80 however, those roles and tasks embody the ideal plea
negotiation.81 For both prosecutors’ offices and public defenders’ offices, the caseloads are
large, the time is spread thin,82 and the goal is to get through as many cases as possible. These
unfortunate truths create a situation far from the ideal envisioned in Part II, and which pales in
comparison to the prepped and confident negotiation on the civil side.
75

Phyllis Kritek explains the importance of this difference. In civil negotiations, an “uneven table” (as she
calls it) might be inevitable due to negotiating strategies, but allowing it to remain without acknowledgement
has serious effects on the legitimacy of the negotiation, specifically: “it keeps persons who are invited to the
uneven table from accessing the opportunities presented. . . it limits the potential of the negotiator to succeed.
People begin to see conflict resolution as just one more way of sustaining existing power structures.” This
explanation shows that this “uneven table” that is ever-present in plea-bargaining is incompatible with
legitimate civil negotiation. Kritek, supra note 69, at 47.
76
See generally Indigent Defense, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-lawreform/public-defense-reform/indigent-defense (last visited Nov. 14, 2021) (defendants who cannot afford their
own attorney are assigned counsel by the court).
77
The fact that many public defenders’ offices are overburdened with cases and have an overall lack of
funding will be discussed later. However, it is important to point out here that the overburdened and
undercompensated nature of public defenders adds to the lack of confidence between them and their clients.
See Uphoff, supra note 49, at 80 (“A weary or frantic lawyer scrambling to cope with too many cases hardly
inspires confidence in her clients.”).
78
Cf. Uphoff, supra note 49, at 80 (clients represented by appointed counsel frequently mistrust their attorney,
aided by the myths and preconceptions of public defenders).
79
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179, 1242 (1975).
80
One should note that, on the topic of “roles and specific tasks of . . . the defense attorney,” some
commentators believe “current conceptions of the defense attorney’s role are often more romanticized than
real.” See id. at 1180.
81
See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1734–35 (1993)
(discussing a two studies: one completed in Phoenix which showed: 47% of defense attorneys entered plea
agreements without interviewing any prosecution witnesses and 30% entered into plea agreements without
interviewing any of the witnesses for the defense. Another study was completed in New York which showed: in
homicide cases, public defenders conducted pretrial interviews of only 21% of witnesses and only 25% of their
clients, and for non-homicide cases, those numbers dropped to 4.2% and 18% respectively).
82
See, e.g., id. at 1735 (“27% of public defenders spend less than 10 minutes with their clients, while 59% of
them spend less than half an hour” with their client).
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The historic relationship between plea bargaining and civil negotiations already
presents significant differences that draw the former away from the principles that make
negotiation a worthwhile alternative to adjudication.83 This is an issue only if the two
concepts are considered identical--as twins. As sisters, distinguishment could just be seen as a
part of what makes them different. The criminal and civil law systems are not meant to be
identical to each other. Prosecutors need to have different powers than defense attorneys
because the entity the prosecutors are representing is different than a criminal defendant. A
different kind of pressure is normal in criminal cases because the possible outcome is a loss of
liberty instead of damages. These differences are not inherently dangerous. But those
differences do inherently give less power to the defendant. Because of that, those differences
can become dangerous when additional facets are added to the mix, such as victim input. The
next section introduces this new facet.
V. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A.

Historical Background

Americans understand that sweeping change is hard to come by without a
substantial movement to show its urgency. The aptly named “Victims’ Rights Movement”
brought the concerns of crime victims to legislator’s discussion tables.84 The beginning of the
movement sought to get financial compensation for victims of crime, but that goal waned
when the major contributor of the compensation programs was defunded.85 Luckily for the
movement, the work done in its infancy created a significant amount of public awareness,
which kept the movement from folding altogether.86 The Movement’s persistence was noted
by then-President Ronald Reagan, which was the necessary momentum to finally passing
legislation that addressed their concerns.87 As with many movements before, the Victims’
Rights Movement modeled their approach off of successful movements of the past, hoping to
achieve their same success.88
The backdrop for the Victims’ Rights Movement were four of the most important
movements in American history: the Civil Rights,89 Antiwar,90 Law and Order,91 and
Women’s Movements.92 Some paved the way to give their hopeful changes any chance at

83

See supra Part IV (B).
See generally MARLENE YOUNG & JOHN STEIN, NAT’L ORG. FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, THE HISTORY OF THE
CRIME
VICTIMS’
MOVEMENT
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
5-6
(2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2005/pdf/historyofcrime.pdf.
85
Id. at 5.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 6.
88
See Steven Derene et al., History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States, in PARTICIPANT’S
TEXT, 2007 NATIONAL VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACADEMY, TRACK 1 II-1, II-7-8 (2007),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.598.3276&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
89
See id. at II-7-8.
90
See id. at II-8-9.
91
See id. at II-10-11.
92
See id. at II-9-10.
84
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being heard on a national level, while others had more of a direct influence on the trajectory
of the Victims’ Rights Movement.93
The initial passions possessed by victims’ advocates could be traced back to the
period of 1953-1969, known as the “Warren Court Era.”94 During this time in the American
judicial system, the Supreme Court took strides to enhance and bolster the Constitutional
rights of defendants.95 Many victims’ advocates understood these decisions to throw the
criminal justice system out of balance and essentially remove them from the process.96
Victims observed the outcomes of this era in the Supreme Court and demanded that they
should have rights, as parties to the controversy, to be heard throughout the case’s progression
and notified of hearings pertinent to their case.97 This anger over being neglected and seeing,
in some cases, their abuser or assaulter be granted more leniency sparked the early stages of
the Victims’ Rights Movement.98
Victims’ activists saw the various successes of the Civil Rights,99 Antiwar,100 and
Women’s Movements101 and used them as a blueprint for their own. Many of the victims’
advocates were either directly a part of or paid close attention to the Civil Rights Movement
and saw how the “American minority” had voice against the actions the government took on
their behalf.102 The young Victims’ Movement also compared itself to the Antiwar Movement
because both were organically cultivated and questioned the government.103 While the
Antiwar Movement questioned the US’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the Victims’
Movement questioned the lack of aid and care the government gave to victims.104

93
See Derene et al., supra note 88, at II-7-8; The Warren Court, 1953-1969, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y,
https://supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courts/warren-court-1953-1969/ (last visited Sep. 19, 2021).
94
Compare Paul G. Cassell et al, Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations? Applying the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges are Filed, 104 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 63 (2014) with
The Warren Court, 1953-1969, supra note 93.
95
The Warren Court, 1953-1969, supra note 93. During this period of time, the Supreme Court held that: exservicemen could not be tried by court-martial for alleged service crimes; courts-martial may not try mothers,
wives, or children of servicemen for crimes carrying the death penalty; a defendant should not have his right to
appeal effectively taken from him for the sole reason that he cannot afford the necessary materials; if a
defendant cannot afford an attorney, he will get one appointed to him; evidence gathered by a warrantless
search is inadmissible in both state and federal courts. Id.
96
See Cassell et al., supra note 94, at 63; Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. 835,
841 (2005); Derene et al., supra note 88, at II-6-7.
97
Cassell et al., supra note 96, at 841; Derene et al., supra note 88, at II-6-7.
98
See Cassell et al., supra note 94, at 63.
99
Derene et al., supra note 88, at II-8.
100
See Mark Engler, Anti-War Movements, from Vietnam to Today, MORNINGSIDE CTR. FOR TEACHING SOC.
RESP. (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.morningsidecenter.org/teachable-moment/lessons/anti-war-movementsvietnam-today.
101
See Katie Johnson, Top 10 Women’s Movements over the Last 100 Years, WINSUMMIT BLOG
https://www.winsummit.com/blog/top-ten-womens-movements-over-the-last-100-years (last visited on Sep. 19,
2021); see Derene et al., supra note 88.
102
See Cassell et al., supra note 94; Derene, supra note 88.
103
See Derene et al., supra note 88.
104
See id., at 8, 11.
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The phase of the Women’s Movement set after the decision of Roe v. Wade105
showed the leaders of the Victims’ Rights Movement how victims106 could ban together to
bring their grievances to those in authority.107 That concept went hand-in-hand with the
beginning of the Law-and-Order Movement.108 The Law and Order Movement sought to
increase the rights of United States citizens in relation to criminal defendants.109 While the
Law-and-Order Movement adjusted well to the Women’s Movement, it generally held an
opposing view to that of the Victims’ Rights activists.110 Victims’ activists responded by
urging for the creation of victim and witness assistance programs that could be accessible at
prosecutor’s offices.111 Near the end of the Law-and-Order Movement, then-President Reagan
created the Task Force for Victims of Crime.112 The Task Force issued a final report,
concluding that in our current system, victims are suffering from a lack of protection from our
justice system and changes need to be made.113
B.

Subsequent Legislation

The same year the Presidential Task Force issued its final report, Congress passed
the Victim and Witness Protection Act,114 marking the first legislative action produced by the
Victims’ Rights Movement.115 Over the next 15 years, Congress passed an additional five
pieces of legislation with the goals of continuing to protect the rights of crime victims.116 The

105

419 U.S. 113 (1973).
These were victims of rape and sexual assault in the context of the Women’s Movement.
107
See Derene et al., supra note 88, at 8.
108
See id.
109
See id. at 10.
110
See id. (“Law and order supporters believed that … victims, once victimized, should be self-sufficient and
not dependent on the government for assistance.”).
111
See id.
112
LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT, 114
(1982), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/87299.pdf.
113
Id. (“[T]he [criminal justice] system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection
. . . The victims of crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to
protect them. This oppression must be addressed.”).
114
An Act to Provide Additional Protections and Assistance to Victims and Witnesses in Federal Cases, Pub.
L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248. This act demonstrates that the legislature understood that the services set out for
victims who wished to be part of the justice process (such as transportation, child-care services, safe places to
wait away from the victim, continued loss of property for trial purposes) and sought to “enhance and protect”
the role of the victim. It amended a rule of criminal procedure to allow for a “victim impact statement” and set
out specific protections from intimidation.
115
See Cassell et al., supra note 94, at 843.
116
(1) Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170. This act set out various rights for
crime victims throughout the trial process. This act was later codified in Title 42 (Public Health and Welfare)
of the U.S.C. instead of Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure).
(2) Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820. The relation this act had to victims’ rights
was that it changed the date on the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 from “1990” to “1991”. This legislation was
also codified in Title 42 instead of Title 18.
(3) Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. This act
set up a “crime victims’ fund” and amended the Victims of Crime Act. This act was also not codified in Title
18.
106
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1980s and 1990s legislation gave guidance to prosecutors about how victims should be treated
during the process of a criminal trial.117 While the legislation was a catalyst for change at the
state level,118 none of the acts were codified in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, essentially keeping
them from the view of judges and attorneys at the federal level.119
The Victims’ Rights Movement still felt it had work to do to overcome some of the
shortcomings that surfaced with the prior legislation.120 Their goal was to get an amendment
passed in the U.S. Constitution.121 After a lengthy process that ultimately led to the
amendment not getting passed,122 activists turned their time and attention to enacting a fully
comprehensible federal statute: The Crime Victims’ Rights Act.123
The shortcomings that plagued the ancestors of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act were
notified and corrected. Codified in Title 18, federal prosecutors will come face to face with
the Act when determining how to treat the victims.124 The Act’s passage ensured other
important facets of the Victims’ Rights Movement such as stated remedies and funding for
victims’ services.125
The portion of the Act relevant to this article is as follows:
A crime victim has the following rights: … the right to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . . plea . . .126
the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain . . .127 A
victim may make a motion to re-open a plea . . . if . . . in the case of a plea,
the accused has not pled to the highest offense charged.128
Crime Victims’ Rights 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4), (9) & (d)(5)(C) (2015).

(4) Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Along with
deterring terrorism, this act sought to seek justice for victims by providing for an effective death penalty. This
act was not codified in Title 18.
(5) Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12. This act amended a provision in
the criminal code to allow crime victims to attend and observe trial. While this amendment was codified in
Title 18, it is still characterized as “proposed legislation.”
117
See Cassell et al., supra note 94, at 844.
118
Nash, supra note 13.
119
Cassel et al., supra note 94, at 845.
120
See id.
121
Id. at 848. The proposed amendment was intended to “restore, preserve, and protect … the practice of
victim participation in the administration of criminal justice.” Id. Its core principles were: (1) the right to notice
of proceedings, (2) the right to be present at the proceedings, (3) the right to be heard, (4) the right to notice of
the defendant’s release or escape, (5) the right to restitution, (6) the right to a speedy trial, and (7) the right to
reasonable protection. See id.
122
See id. at 849–50.
123
See id. at 850.
124
See id.
125
See Cassell et al., supra note 94.
126
Crime victims’ rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).
127
Id. § 3771(a)(9).
128
Id. § 3771(d)(5)(C).
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It is worth noting that these provisions, and the corresponding provisions in the
Missouri statute and constitutional amendment, do not give the victim a veto power.129 The
victim is not granted the right to have the final say in determining what plea should be offered
or accepted.130 However, these provisions allow the crime victim to still have an influential
role in the plea process.131 Simply put, the victim is no longer a passive observer of the
litigation; they are now an active player in the game. The next section of this article proposes
that these rights should be modified to make plea negotiations a more balanced procedure
between the victim and defendant in alignment with the principles of ADR.
VI. ANALYSIS
The provisions in the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,132 Missouri state statute,133 and
state constitutional amendment134 that give conferring and suggesting power to victims are the
only parts of their respective sections deserving of critique. Provisions which allow for a party
to flex their rights at the expense of the defendant should not be adopted without further
questioning. There should be a middle ground. Understanding why the legislature originally
did not allow for a veto power could aid in the search for that middle ground.
A.

Rationale for the Limitation of the Victim’s Power

The criminal justice system does not want to give too much power to private
actors.135 There is almost unanimous agreement that allowing a private party to have a veto
power in plea negotiations would put private interests before public interests.136 Whether the
reason is to make sure the defendant gets the sentence the victim thinks they deserve,137 or
because the victim wants their day in court,138 the private desires of the victim are not desires
society should choose to herald above public necessities.139
This understanding of why legislators set victims power limitations where they did
could give insight into what might be a feasible alteration to the statute. If legislators knew
129

See generally Victim Input Into Plea Agreements, Legal Series Bulletin #7, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME
(Nov. 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/2.html.
130
See id.
131
See id.
132
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a)(4), (d)(5)(C).
133
Rights of Victims and Witnesses—Written Notification, Requirements, MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209.1(4)
(2016) (“The following rights shall automatically be afforded to victims of dangerous felonies: For victims, the
right to confer with . . . the prosecutor . . . regarding guilty pleas. . .”).
134
MO. CONST. art. I, § 32, cl. 2. (Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights, as defined
by law: Upon request of the victim, the right to be . . . heard at guilty pleas . . .).
135
See generally Nita Mazumder, Defining Public Interest Law, UNIV. OF MICH.: UNIV. CAREER CTR.,
https://careercenter.umich.edu/article/defining-public-interest-law (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
136
See Michael O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
323, 323 (2007).
137
The fact that the victim is not truly a party to these negotiations or to the case itself makes this an even more
important limit on their rights. The Prosecutor represents the state as a whole, not the victim as an individual.
138
See, e.g., Robin L. Barton, The Role of Victims in Plea Bargaining, THE CRIME REP. (Mar 5. 2012),
https://thecrimereport.org/2012/03/05/2012-03-the-role-of-victims-in-plea-bargaining/.
139
See id.
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they did not want to grant an excess of power to private citizens, then appealing to that virtue
in an attempt to restructure the statute could lead to success. The fact that victims lack power
to steer the negotiations does not negate the effect their conferring and suggesting powers
have on the practice of plea bargaining.140
B.

Effects on Plea Bargaining

As noted in section IV of this article, even though plea bargaining is essentially the
criminal-law version of ADR’s negotiation, there are some key differences that distinguish
the former from the latter.141 The distinguishing factors are exacerbated when combined with
the rights the legislation discussed in this article grants to victims. This section combines all
the distinguishing factors into two overarching problematic effects: added complexity and
assumed causation.
a.

Added Complexity

Adding an extra party to a negotiation makes for a much more complex situation.142
In civil negotiations, the party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)143 and
suggested offers must be reanalyzed far more often when additional parties are added to the
mix.144 This complexity exacerbates the already troublesome and significant power
differentials inherent in plea bargaining.145
Literature suggests that the circumstances of civil negotiation, which are less
influenced by differences in power than criminal negotiations,146 can be affected in this way;
it follows that the effects on the criminal side would be much more substantial. A clear
example of this is seen on the face of the noted victims’ rights provisions.147 When a victim
confers in plea agreements,148 he/she enters the sphere of influence of the prosecutor, even
though they are not granted an explicit veto power. Through conferring, the prosecutor should
obtain the views of the victim regarding the proposed plea.149 Being able to express their
views on the proposed plea while being in the sphere of influence of the prosecutor allows for
the already present power dynamic to be exploited even further.
Suppose the prosecutor learns, through their mandatory conference with the victim,
that the victim is resentful towards the defendant and desires the prosecutor to be cutthroat
140

See generally Nash, supra note 13, at 1436–37. (suggesting that the goal of the Victims’ Rights Movement
was to make the criminal justice system morally responsive to victims).
141
See supra Part IV (B).
142
See What is a Multiparty Negotiation?, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT.,
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/tag/multiparty-negotiation/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
143
This is essentially a party’s bottom line. Negotiations might get to a point where one side would rather take
their BATNA (go to trial, for example) instead of continuing to negotiate.
144
See HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT., supra note 142.
145
Id.
146
See supra Part IV Section B.
147
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4), (d)(5)(C); MO REV. STAT. § 595.209; MO CONST. art. I, § 32, cl. 2.
148
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5)(C); MO. REV. STAT. § 595.209.1(4); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32, cl. 2.
149
See OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 129.

147
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository,

15

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
and merciless in their prosecution of the defendant. Even though the prosecutor is
representing the state, and not expressly the victim, it is not unreasonable for the prosecutor to
subconsciously factor the victim’s desires into their proposal to the defendant. The victim is a
third person indirectly influencing the plea discussion’s most powerful party.
Consequentially, that exploitation puts the defendant’s substantive due process
rights at risk.150 Both the Fifth151 and Fourteenth Amendments152 grant the right to due
process153 to every U.S. citizen. Much is written about the effects of plea bargaining on a
defendant’s procedural due process,154 but it is the protection from the government that is in
danger here. Injecting a third party into the negotiating dynamics of a plea consideration
deprives a defendant their substantive due process rights. 155 When the government passes a
law that allows for such a power differential, the courts should have the freedom to limit the
effect of its enforcement on due process grounds.156
b.

Assumed Causation

The definition of “victim” in the statute establishes that a person becomes a “crime
victim” when the fact finder decides a defendant commits a federal offense.157 Stating the
defendant victimized a person is improper until adjudicating the defendant as guilty through a
trial or plea.158 That is not to say definitively that the complaining witness has not been
victimized by someone. It is just improper to say, at this stage of the proceedings, that
specifically it was the defendant who victimized them. This sentiment is becoming more
common as some judges are ordering the word not be used during the trail when the issue is
brought up during pretrial hearings.159
A response to this might be that the word “victim” is a legal status term that denotes
the type of involvement that person is able to have in the litigation.160 While the term “victim”
150

See generally Constitutional Due Process, PRICE BENOWTIZ: MD. CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://marylandcriminallawyer.com/constitutional-due-process/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
151
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
152
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
153
BENOWITZ, supra note 150 (“Procedural Due Process refers to the process used to try and convict
defendants accused of crimes . . . [S]ubstantive Due Process is a principle allowing courts to prevent
government interference with fundamental rights.”).
154
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal
Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventative Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1505, 1516 (2016).
155
See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, cl. 4, XIV, § 1.
156
Cf. BENOWITZ, supra note 150.
157
18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A) (“The term ‘crime victim’ means a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of a federal offense . . .”).
158
See Use of the Term “Victim” in Criminal Proceedings, NAT. CRIME VICTIM L. INST. NEWS, 2009 (updated
2014), at 1 (“While ‘victim’ is a legal status that does not have any relationship to a defendant’s guilt or
innocence, courts are often hesitant to permit the use of the term ‘victim’ during trial. This hesitancy stems
from a concern that the term ‘victim’ conclusively states a crime has occurred; and, therefore, that its use is
prejudicial, and violates a defendant’s constitutional due process right to a fair trial.”).
159
Dale Harris, A Judge’s View: Avoiding the term “victim” helps ensure fair trials, DULUTH NEWS TRIB.
(Nov. 2, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/opinion/columns/a-judges-view-avoiding-theterm-victim-helps-ensure-fair-trials.
160
Id.
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is understood to be a legal status term, thus granting them specific rights, the qualifications
required to be deemed a “victim” are not met at the plea-bargaining stage. The person must
have been harmed “as a result of the commission of a federal offense.”161 Until the defendant
is either found guilty by a jury162 or accepts a plea of guilty, the defendant is deemed innocent
of any crime they are charged with.163 Considering a person to be a “victim” at this stage of
the proceedings questions this pillar of our justice system.164
It also might be true to say that acceptance of a plea deal always assumes causation.
In the acceptance of a plea bargain, the defendant typically pleads guilty165 without having the
prosecutor show evidence to a jury that would prove causation. However, the assumption of
causation in that scenario occurs at the time of acceptance. When the process of configuring a
plea allows conferring and suggesting power, the court assumes causation prior to the
declaring of guilt. Allowing this takes fundamental rights away from the defendant and gives
those rights to a party who has not yet met the qualifications of their legal status.
The noted powers granted to victims through legislation passed on behalf of the
effort of the Victims’ Rights Movement deepen the already muddy waters of plea bargaining.
The practice of plea bargaining is already distinct from the traditional ADR method, and those
distinctions are magnified when influenced by a handful of those rights granted to victims.166
If one of the goals of plea bargaining is to utilize a successful dispute resolution tactic found
in civil cases, the current method distances it from the negotiation model. Finding the solution
that still emphasizes the necessary rights for victims without removing the fundamental rights
granted to criminal defendants, what one might say is the middle ground, is crucial to the
protection of both parties.
c.

Suggested Alterations

The most direct, but also most intrusive alteration would be to eliminate the
provisions in the statute that allow victims of crime to have a substantial part in the pleabargaining process.167 Limiting the victims to notification, reasonable protection, timely
information, and resolution of their case until there is a causal link associated between their
victimization and the defendant would, essentially, extinguish every issue raised in this
article. Put differently, not allowing a victim a role in the plea-bargaining process removes the

161

18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A).
Or judge if a bench trial.
163
See Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1343, 1373 (2016) (“[The defendant] does have a legal and moral right to a factually reliable adjudication of
guilt.”).
164
See Michelle Mark & Jake Epstein, Judge in Kyle Rittenhouse case explains why he wouldn’t let
prosecutors call the men who the teenager shot “victims,” INSIDER (Nov. 17, 2021, 11:33 AM),
https://www.insider.com/kyle-rittenhouse-judge-explains-why-proseuctors-couldnt-say-victims-2021-11.
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See, e.g., Micah Schwartzbach, What Does Pleading “No Contest” Mean? NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-pleading-guilty-contest.html (last visited Nov 14, 2021).
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added complexity present in three-party discussions168 and decreases the chances for a
premature inference of guilt.169
Additionally, analyzing the added complexity and the assumed causation
accompanying the provisions creates an argument that directly conflicts with the rationale for
not allowing victims’ a veto power.170 Allowing a victim to have a say in the plea-bargaining
process still puts the desires of private actors above the desires of the public at large. The
alleged legislative intent of the federal statute171 suggests that regardless of its enactment,
society still supports the idea that public interests are the driving force of the criminal system,
not private ones. If that was the reason victims were not given limitless power to begin with,
the argument for alteration has a likelihood of success.
The difficulty with this alteration, other than the ones inherent in changing a statute,
is that this option restricts victims. An ideal solution would be able to empower victims
without removing defendant protections. While this is not an ideal solution, it is the most
imminently feasible one. The other suggestions involve expansive criminal justice reform,
which is a slow-moving process. Altering a statute is not greased lightning but contrasting
statutory edits with the sweeping change of reform, it is a process that could get to the middle
ground the fastest.
As this article discusses, the imbalance between the two attorneys creates a major
problematic difference between civil negotiation and criminal plea bargaining. Without a
change in the imbalance, the road to a fair shake between victims and defendants remains
bumpy and difficult. Increasing the resources allocated to both parties to aid them in the
completion of their preparatory tasks while decreasing the number of criminalized offenses in
general pair well in addressing this issue. Solutions directed at the broader issue of our
criminal justice system also indirectly affect the plea-bargaining issues raised in this article.
Although toeing the line of being overbroad, the benefits of this change cannot be
overstated. In the United States today, there are more than 4,500 different criminal offenses a
person could commit, ranging from violent offenses to petty drug crimes, all the way down to
unintentional actions.172 This is one of the key factors that leads to Missouri public defenders
having an average caseload of 240 cases per defender.173
When an attorney is responsible for the representation of 240 defendants, it is hard
to fathom that they can prepare for plea negotiations to the same extent as a civil attorney. If
our society can make a turn and shrink the number of criminalized offenses, public defenders
will see a decrease in their caseload, and thus be better able to prepare for an important plea
negotiation. How does this affect Victims’ Rights legislation? By lowering the number of
cases held by a defense attorney, the pressures that are amplified by the addition of the victim
to the negotiation process decrease. With less of a burden caused by the enormous caseload,
168
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the defendant can retain more protection while not taking away any of the rights recently
granted to the victim.174
Similarly, the issues attached to the conferring and suggesting power of the victim
can be neutralized through reforming the cash-bail system. Low-income defendants can wait
in jail cells for weeks or months in anticipation of their trial if they cannot afford to pay the
bail amount set by the judge.175 In addition to the other injustices wrought by the current cash
bail system, the pressure to accept a plea deal increases when the defendant has already been
incarcerated during the waiting period.176 Accepting a moderate prison sentence with the
possibility of parole does not sound like the worst possible outcome for the defendant when
they have already been separated from their loved ones for an indefinite period of time
because the defendant cannot afford bail. In fact, accepting that plea deal might sound like the
best option for getting out of confinement, no matter if the defendant knows they’re
innocent.177
Reforming the cash bail system to make it so that more defendants would be able to
spend the time waiting for their trial with their families neutralizes the issues attached to
Victims’ Rights Legislation because defendants would have a more realistic choice against
accepting a plea bargain. The mental turmoil a defendant goes through while sitting in a jail
cell because they cannot afford to buy their freedom178 is another factor that adds to the power
differential analyzed throughout this article.179 Giving more rights and dignity to the
defendant and granting more acknowledgment to the notion of their presumed innocence
while not limiting the rights offered to victims would be a win-win for both persons.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our nation is filled with groups who were forced to interact with a criminal justice
system not designed to work for them. Victims are one of those groups, and those groups
deserve reform. Reform tends to be born of passion. While that characteristic of reform is
beneficial for starting the change, it can subsequently push reform away from the central area
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of compromise, likely making its result either polarizing180 or detrimental to another societal
group.
Even though the steps taken by the Victims’ Rights Movement fall into the latter
category, all hope is not lost. The majority of the benefits granted to victims through this
movement were conceived through an impressive combination of passionate advocacy and a
landing spot in the middle ground. There is no reason to think that future adjustments to this
legislation or to the criminal justice system would not allow victims and criminal defendants
to exercise their rights without being in direct conflict with each other. In the land where we
declare to have “liberty and justice for all,” that should not just be allowed, it should be
expected.

180
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